- Resolution 884 (1993) from 30 April 1993
- Resolution 853 (1993) from 29 Jule 1993
- Resolution 874 (1993) from 14 October 1993
- Resolution 884 (1993) from 12 November 1993
- Vladimir Kazimirov. Karabakh and Resolutions of United Nations Security Council
The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993 and 853 (1993) of 29 July 1993, and recalling the statement read by the President of the Council, on behalf of the Council, on 18 August 1993 (S/26326), Having considered the letter dated 1 October 1993 from the Chairman of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/26522), Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region, Taking note of the high-level meetings which took place in Moscow on 8 October 1993 and expressing the hope that they will contribute to the improvement of the situation and the peaceful settlement of the conflict, Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic and of all other States in the region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, Expressing once again its grave concern at the human suffering the conflict has caused and at the serious humanitarian emergency in the region and expressing in particular its grave concern at the displacement of large numbers of civilians in the Azerbaijani Republic,
- Calls upon the parties concerned to make effective and permanent the cease-fire established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation in support of the CSCE
- Reiterates again its full support for the peace process being pursued within the framework of the CSCE, and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group;
- Welcomes and commends to the parties the "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)" set out on 28 September 1993 at the meeting of the CSCE Minsk Group and submitted to the parties concerned by the Chairman of the Group with the full support of nine other members of the Group, and calls on the parties to accept it;
- Expresses the conviction that all other pending questions arising from the conflict and not directly addressed in the "Adjusted timetable" should be settled expeditiously through peaceful negotiations in the context of the CSCE Minsk process;
- Calls for the immediate implementation of the reciprocal and urgent steps provided for in the CSCE Minsk Group’s "Adjusted timetable", including the withdrawal of forces from recently occupied territories and the removal of all obstacles to communications and transportation;
- Calls also for an early convening of the CSCE Minsk Conference for the purpose of arriving at a negotiated settlement to the conflict as provided for in the timetable, in conformity with the 24 March 1992 mandate of the CSCE Council of Ministers;
- Requests the Secretary-General to respond favourably to an invitation to send a representative to attend the CSCE Minsk Conference and to provide all possible assistance for the substantive negotiations that will follow the opening of the Conference;
- Supports the monitoring mission developed by the CSCE;
- Calls on all parties to refrain from all violations of international humanitarian law and renews its call in resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993) for unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts in all areas affected by the conflict;
- Urges all States in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from any interference or intervention which would lead to the widening of the conflict and undermine peace and security in the region;
- Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population and to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in security
- Requests also the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference to continue to report to the Council on the progress of the Minsk process and on all aspects of the situation on the ground, and on present and future cooperation between the CSCE and the United Nations in this regard;
- Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 29 July 1993 and 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993, Reaffirming its full support for the peace process being pursued within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group, Taking note of the letter dated 9 November 1993 from the Chairman-in-Office of the Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council and its enclosures (S/26718, annex), Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region, Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities as consequence of the violations of the cease-fire and excesses in the use of force in response to those violations, in particular the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz in the Azerbaijani Republic, Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic and of all other States in the region, Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, Expressing grave concern at the latest displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz and on Azerbaijan’s southern frontier,
- Condemns the recent violations of the cease-fire established between the parties, which resulted in a resumption of hostilities, and particularly condemns the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic;
- Calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993), and to ensure
that the forces involved are not provided with the means to extend their military campaign further;
- Welcomes the Declaration of 4 November 1993 of the nine members of the CSCE Minsk Group (S/26718) and commends the proposals contained therein for unilateral cease-fire declarations;
- Demands from the parties concerned the immediate cessation of armed hostilities and hostile acts, the unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces from the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, and the withdrawal of occupying
forces from other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic in accordance with the "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)" (S/26522, appendix) as amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993;
- Strongly urges the parties concerned to resume promptly and to make effective and permanent the cease-fire established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government of the Russian
Federation in support of the CSCE Minsk Group, and to continue to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict within the context of the CSCE Minsk process and the "Adjusted timetable" as amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting
in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993;
- Urges again all States in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from any interference or intervention, which would lead to the widening of the conflict and undermine peace and security in the region;
- Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population, including that in the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz and on Azerbaijan’s southern frontier, and to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in security and dignity;
- Reiterates its request that the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference continue to report to the Council on the progress of the Minsk process and on all aspects of the situation on the ground, in particular on the implementation of its relevant resolutions, and on present and future cooperation between the CSCE and the United Nations in this regard;
- Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Vladimir Kazimirov. Karabakh and Resolutions of United Nations Security Council
In contemporary international affairs UN Security Council resolutions are among the defining documents. All UN member states, of course, focus on their full and timely implementation (and not the sort of delayed or selective). On the Karabakh conflict there are 4 resolutions (822, 853, 874 and 884). All of them are taken in the midst of the war in Karabakh, from April 30 to November 12, 1993
Skidding in the negotiation process and the daily war of words the conflicting parties often refer to their individual points. Alas, each side underlines only those which are advantageous to itself in these resolutions, trying to avoid in every way a comprehensive approach and perform its own obligations. Both sides electrify the situation around the conflict to the level, when anyone who points to the distortions, is immediately being credited to the agents of the opposing camp. Despite this, there is a need to comprehensively consider the basic requirements of UN Security Council with regard to circumstances and the progress of this conflict.
In recent years, it is Baku that often requires the implementation of resolutions, but only in the part of the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from 7 regions of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenian-Karabakh forces, and return of their refugees. Now more persistently the Nagorno-Karabakh is being covered by this requirement; Heydar Aliyev was more moderate in that (need too much formal logic, hardly applicable to conflict situations, to consider Nagorno-Karabakh an occupied land).
In other words, Azerbaijan essentially reduces the requirements of the resolutions to liberation of the occupied territories. It needs to draw attention to the serious consequences of armed conflict, to the pain of the displaced people. But thereby it also wants to push into the background, move on to "afterwards" the removing of the main contentious issue and cause of the conflict - the definition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
1. Adequate explanation of the UN Security Council resolutions is impossible without a hierarchy of their claims, without regard to the fact that the summer and autumn of 1993 were the peak time of the war. Therefore, the priority, the main requirement was to immediately cease fire, all military action and hostile acts. It runs through all 4 resolutions, like their common core-bone.
UN Security Council put forward this demand is April 30, 1993 at the first resolution 822, but for its implementation a whole year and three other resolutions were not enough. For another year of the blood was shed, the tide of refugees and displaced persons was rising. "Immediateness" of cease-fire could not mean a delay until May 1994. Can such a stubborn disregard by the parties to these fundamental requirements be counted as the timely implementation of UN Security Council resolutions?
Each new resolution took into account the changing circumstances. After with support of Russia first agreements on the limitation of military operations were reached, refusal from Baku to extend them and the subsequent fall of Agdam, Resolution 853 of July 29, urged the parties "to reach a lasting ceasefire agreements and implement them." Resolution 874 of October 14, when a temporary cease-fire mediated by Russia was held, called on to make it effective and permanent. After its break from the Azerbaijani side, the last resolution 884 of 12 November "strongly" encouraged "to urgently resume the cease-fire established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation in support of the Minsk Group”. But it never worked urgent; it took exactly six more months.
It is time to clarify which party violated this basic requirement of all resolutions and holds a special responsibility, because of its failure to address this crucial problem initiated the breakdown of nearly all the other requirements - integrated non-implementation of UN SC resolutions.
Of course, there are no innocent here, but the "garland" yet undoubtedly belongs to the Azerbaijani side.
Even losing control over their territories, Azerbaijan's leadership - either with A. Elchibey, and G. Aliyev - persisted in trying to achieve a breakthrough in the war and solve the conflict by force, as if unaware of its own responsibility for the emergence and expansion of the occupation. During the years of Russia’s active mediation a whole calendar was collected of disruption of ceasefire by parties, withdrawals from such arrangements and other underestimations of peacekeeping initiatives (The resolution 884 says about that in Aesopian language also). Already having all 4 of Security Council resolution, Baku three times (in December 1993 and February 1994) explicitly ignored the chance to put an end to hostilities.
The cease-fire from the May 12, 1994 reached with the assistance of Russia is not so much on the UN Security Council resolutions, but rather on the basis of statements of the Council of CIS Heads of State on April 15, 1994, but the goal was common. This agreement was already different than prior ones: not temporary, for this number of days, but indefinite (as default), that is practically constant, and signed at the insistence of Moscow, not by two as previously, but by all three parties to the conflict (not only Baku and Stepanakert, but Yerevan too).
2. When the war in spite of all resolutions, was still going on, they condemned the escalation of military actions, the seizure of new towns and districts, the repeated ceasefire violations, conducting of bombardments and shelling of settlements, called on to refrain from all violations of international humanitarian law. It is also an indicator that not only the most important was not implemented, but much more from the UN Security Council resolutions.
3. Through all the resolutions passes also the demand of liberation of the occupied territories or an immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces.
Baku asserts that all the resolutions demand the unconditional withdrawal, but they do not – only the resolution 853 of 29 July. How then the word "unconditional" has disappeared from resolutions 874 and 884? Accidentally or due to forgetfulness? Or perhaps as a consequence of continued failure by one side of implementation of the main demands - the cessation of military actions? Who could count on the withdrawal of forces without the cessation of fighting? And who did not want to stop them? The UN Security Council could not reward for failure of implementation of its resolutions. Just on this background, the initially unconditional demand has become a subject of negotiations between the parties. This question was repeatedly the subject of negotiations, but was not settled either because of the position of the Armenians, and because Baku immediately insisted on the withdrawal from everywhere, even from Shushi and Lachin, not wanting to even to touch the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
It is hardly realistic almost ultimatum like demands to begin with the liberation of occupied lands without consideration of other issues and commitments to them. It is futile to begin a phased settlement without the most reliable guarantees of non-resumption of military actions. And the militant rhetoric is even more absolutely contraindicated to the transition to a phase resolution. Co-Chairs of the Minsk process - Russia, the USA and France, calling on the parties themselves to find a basis of mutually acceptable agreement, also do not demand anything unconditional. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons continue to pay for the strenuous efforts of those years to resolve the conflict by force. The burden of the immense prolonging of negotiations is also thrown over upon them. None of the leaders ever dared to take the responsibility for the hardships of his people, trying to shift the blame entirely on the other side.
4. UNSC resolutions contain a number of other claims and appeals, which remain unfulfilled:
a) "Restore the economic, transport and energy links in the region" (853); "removal of all obstacles to communications and transport (874).
From the very beginning of the conflict Azerbaijan has used a total blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, accusing, in turn, Armenia in blockade of Nakhichevan. To meet these requirements it puts the release of lands as a prerequisite. In addition, Baku has cut contacts with Armenia, and even more so with Nagorno-Karabakh in all spheres;
b) A number of appeals dealt with the negotiation process.
Since Azerbaijan yet on 19 May 1992 refused to go to the Minsk Conference, before the Armenians will not leave their occupation of Shushi and Lachin, and April 6, 1993 left the consultations of the “Minsk Five" in Geneva, UN Security Council resolution proposed to" immediately resume negotiations ... in the framework of peace process of the Minsk Group” (822), have urged to refrain from any actions that impede the peaceful resolution of conflict, and to continue negotiations within the Minsk Group, as well as through direct contacts "(853), called for an early convention of the Minsk Conference (874).
The negotiations within the Minsk Group have been continued in 1994, but direct contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, just contrary to resolutions 853, 874, 884, Baku, on the contrary has completely turned off in late 1993. A party confronting Baku the resolution names "local Armenian forces" (822), the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan "(853, 884). And under direct contact, respectively, Baku-Stepanakert contacts are understood (also because for several times the agreement on cease-fire with the assistance of Russia are mentioned there and all of them, virtually all were signed in 1993 with Stepanakert - Yerevan did not participate there).
Completely separately in all 4 of the resolution was spoken of the deterioration of relations and tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Neither one of them marked Armenia as the conflict side (although this is inaccurate).
Appeals were addressed to it to "continue to" or "use its influence on the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (853, 884). Nagorno-Karabakh passes as a party to the conflict in the context, although called - as well as Azerbaijan – once an interested party, and then just a party (853, 874, 884). Indirectly, the resolutions bring to the fact that this conflict has a tripartite configuration.
The resolutions also touched upon other issues, including legal, humanitarian, but here we consider only the most principal, determining compliance or failure of these decisions.
As the main results can be stated:
AZERBAIJAN persistently did not comply with UN Security Council resolution in the basics – the ceasefire, military actions and hostile acts that negatively affected also the fulfillment of other requirements.
Nor implements it them now: 1) neither in part of the restoration of economic, transport and energy links in the region, 2) nor in the part of use of direct contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, 3) nor in the part of convention of the Minsk Conference.
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh still do not meet the requirements of the withdrawal of occupying forces from areas of Azerbaijan outside Nagorno-Karabakh, insisting on a batch, comprehensive settlement.
ARMENIA little acted upon to provide a restraining influence on NK, and now wrongly replaces it in the negotiation process, which again, but differently distorts the actual configuration of the conflict.
As a result, the only achievement is a ceasefire, which lasts for more than 10 years. It is impossible to count UN Security Council resolution on Karabakh implemented, and the positions of the parties in conflict appropriate to them.
It is significant that the UN Security Council did not accept any more resolutions on the conflict, because failure of parties to comply with those undermines its credibility.
Of course, it is hard to consider 11-year-old resolutions error-free and ever-efficient.
They are dictated by the realities of that time.
It is out of doubt that Armenia should be considered as a party, which more clearly would reflect the tripartite configuration of the conflict.
UN Security Council failed to condemn mercenary activities, which already has started up its roots at that time and later acquired a scandalous extent. There are other mistakes also.
Now, when with one or another aim attempts to re-involve the UN to resolution the Karabakh conflict are made, it is important to sum up the results of the previous phase of a decade ago. We cannot close our eyes to the past – we should learn from it.
It is important to demand from the leadership of all parties in different forms and from all platforms a strong political will for resolution, serious efforts and active negotiations (instead of false gestures of maneuvering, information warfare and propagandistic shows).
For now their efforts are not enough. They must agree on a basis of peaceful settlement that would later allow accepting a new UN Security Council resolution in support of a historic reconciliation between Armenians and Azeris.
The international community must question the parties - whether they are able to recognize the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as the issue of a dispute?
It is clear for the whole world, but one cannot say that about the parties.
Whatever smarty it could sound, the leadership of all parties still have to pass this test on realism and the ability to move, finally, to a constructive search for solutions.
If not, then what is the issue of the conflict, for what they had had to negotiate for so many years?
If yes, than this would be the first step away from the current ultimatum demands, precluding any other solution, except in their favor - the first step towards a more civilized solution to the dispute, the elimination of futile, but dangerous impulses to its forceful solution and overcome the serious consequences of armed conflict.